On 5 November, a drone strike in Cité Soleil hit Mathias Saintil, the leader of Haiti’s “Boston” gang. He died of his wounds in hospital. Police confirmed his death four days later, and in the same breath announced that at least 2,000 Salvadoran troops had arrived in the country (Livemint). Nobody claimed the strike. That was the whole idea.

Haiti has become the cleanest test yet of what a privatised war looks like. Erik Prince’s Vectus Global holds a ten-year contract that started as gang suppression and has since spread into roads, borders and customs collection. Eighteen months on, checkpoints still choke the road from Cap Haïtien to Port-au-Prince (CNN). Prince won’t say what he’s being paid. He’ll only say that “our cost is one-sixth of what their annual camp cost was.”

And the model is spreading. In Sudan, a confidential UN report obtained by The New York Times found that the UAE hired Colombian mercenaries through Global Security Services Group and moved them in via Libya, Somalia and Chad (NYT). Middle East Eye says the report “establishes conclusively” the Emirates’ role (MEE). A war fought with hired hands can go on forever, and the only thing anyone ever audits is the invoice.

Moscow has its own version. Analysts estimate that around 300 Russians from Wagner and Africa Corps have died in Mali. That number doesn’t come from any official count; it was pieced together from a hacked Rosstat database (Newsweek Romania). Meanwhile, the ICC is weighing whether filming atrocities and posting them to Telegram counts as a war crime in its own right (Legalbrief).

What’s new is the layering. El Salvador’s deployment went ahead with Washington’s blessing and flew in on US C-130s, and Salvadorans already make up much of Vectus’s workforce (Asia Times). This week, thousands of Haitians marched to thank President Bukele. In effect, they were cheering a subcontractor (Tanjug).

More are lining up. On 18 November, Agema Global’s chief executive, Pasit Viwatkurkul, said his firm is ready to go in as well. It’s one more company queuing up for a country that has already lost its monopoly on violence.

This is what these companies do to a state, and you rarely see it in any single act. First they take over security. Then they take over the revenue that pays for it. Because Vectus’s contract reaches into customs, its income depends on a busy border, not on the gangs going away. As the contractor’s job grows, local forces wither. Eventually the government can’t act without it, the war turns into the business case, and the men who signed the contract are the only ones who can end it. Sudan follows the same logic with a different invoice: hired Colombians fed into a conflict that has no way out.

An armed man stands at a checkpoint managed by American and Egyptian security forces on the Netzarim corridor, where Gazans are attempting to pass to the north of the Palestinian enclave, on Jan. 29, 2025. (Credit: Omar al-Qattaa/AFP/Getty Images)
An armed man stands at a checkpoint managed by American and Egyptian security forces on the Netzarim corridor, where Gazans are attempting to pass to the north of the Palestinian enclave, on Jan. 29, 2025. (Credit: Omar al-Qattaa/AFP/Getty Images)

Why governments want this isn’t hard to see. UN peacekeeping is slow, expensive and politically risky. A company can be hired in weeks and dropped without a vote.

A contract also means no flag-draped coffins. And when a contractor kills someone, the state can say it never signed anything. The State Department insists it has no contract with Prince in Congo, even as his firm collects mining revenue there (ORF).

What states are really buying is deniability. Someone else pays the bill: people in Cité Soleil, in El Fasher, in a village in Mali. The men doing the killing have letterheads now.